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Remarks on L. Wittgenstein’s Form of Life
Wittgenstein uses the concept of form of life only five times in
his Philosophical Investigations1. Four of them are helpful when one
tries to capture the meaning of form of life. This fact can actually
be explained in many ways. First of all, the concept of form of life
is not important for Wittgenstein. Secondly, he uses other concepts
instead. Thirdly, it is “the semantic field” of concepts correlated
with form of life that is important and not merely form of life it-
self2. However, there is no doubt that the concept of form of life is
one of the key categories  in the second period of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy3.  Two  other  concepts,  namely,  ‘grammar’  and  ‘cri-
terion’, are closely connected with form of life and they make it
possible to penetrate deeper into a given problem. During the ana-
lysis  of  these  categories  their  mutua1  relations  and connections
will be mainly emphasized. The reflections will consider ‘the logic
of  structure’  in  the  first  case  and ‘the  logic  of  function’,  in  the
second case.
1 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxfors: Basil Blackwe, 1958.
2M. Black. „”Lebensform” and „Sprachspiel” in Wittgenstein’s Later Work”, in: Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contempo-
rary Thought, Vienna 1978, p. 325
3 N. Malcolm, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, in: G. Pitcher (ed.),  Wittgenstein: “The Philosophica1 Investigations”, New York





The Context of Grammar
Grammar4 is discussed by Wittgenstein in two ways: linguistic
and metaphysical5.  The former  performs  an important  function,
however limited to language as such. First of all, grammar can dis-
cuss the connections between words, which consequently leads to
the analysis of the internal logic of language. Showing “a gram-
matica1 reference” between two expressions takes place here,  as
well as revealing false analogies between them as “grammatically
delusive”. Secondly, grammar in this approach can diagnose con-
ceptual  puzzlements,  leading  to  ‘purifying’  language.  Here  the
philosopher emphasises the non-empirical character of grammar.
Although  it  sometimes  seems  that  questions  have  an  empirical
character,  actually they are grammatical by nature:  “You have a
new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You inter-
pret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-phys-
ical phenomenon which you are observing” [PI 401]. This kind of
puzzlements occurs when “we predicate of the thing what lies in
the method of representing it” [PI 104]. 
According  to  the  philosopher,  linguistic  puzzlements  occur
when one gets lost in the grammar of expressions, as a result of be-
ing entangled in the rules regulating their use [PO 90]. In effect,
puzzlement ceases to be a paradox but by means of inciting inquir-
ies it allows us to get a clear vision of grammar itself. As an ex-
ample we can use the philosopher’ s remarks on such words as “to
know”, “knowledge”, “getting to know” (but also “chair”) [BB, p.
23–24 ]. What follows from them is the fact that the grammar of a
given word gives us the review of the variety of expressions in
which a given word appears in a typica1 way. Out of these re-
marks the second important feature of grammar emerges, namely
its connection with the world, which refers us to the metaphysical
aspect of the use of grammar.
4 One should not confuse grammar understood by Wittgenstein with grammar
as a set of rules. The first one has a philosophical (logical) character and the second
one a linguistic character.
5 J.  Bouveresse, "La notion de 'grammaire'  chez le second Wittgenstein",  in:
Wittgenstein et le probleme d'une philosophie de la science,  Paris 1970, p. 173–89; R.
Harris,  Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein – How to play games with words,  Rout-
ledge, 1988, p. 61–86. 
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The thing is not about understanding the connection literally
because the relation between the world and grammar has an indir-
ect character, it is mediated through language. However, it does
not prevent us from investigating the essence of an object as such.
But “essence is expressed by grammar” [PI 371] which means that
the analysis of grammar of a notion (for example “knowledge”) al-
lows us to formulate the essence of a corresponding object (know-
ledge)6 This actual showing of the world through language (gram-
mar) is interesting but we need to ask ourselves about the mere
possibility of its happening, which is so far mysterious. Wittgen-
stein passes the following remark: “Grammar tells what kind of
object anything is” [PI 373], in other words, grammar is a matter of
“determining the relation between an expression and what in the
world that expression is used for”7.
Grammar determines the place of a notion in the system of no-
tions  (of  language),  and also,  what follows from the quotations
mentioned above, its connection with an object. In this way gram-
mar ‘controls’ the possib1e references of other notions to the given
one, their relation with it. It is obvious that it is grammar and not
an object that possesses the possibilities  of all  the situations. To
know grammar of a word is to know what kind of objects can be
combined with a word. For grammar governs “the ‘possibilities’ of
phenomena”  by  regulating  “the  kind  of  statement  that  we  make
about phenomena” [PI 90]8. Thereby it determines ‘the content’ of
the world in both its possible and actual existence. 
One  should  pay  attention  to  one  more,  essential  feature  of
grammar. As a set of ru1es determining in which relations words
6 H.F. Pitikin. Wittgenstein and Justice, Univ. of Califomia Press, 1973, p. 117.
7 P. Cavell, The Claim to Rationality, Harvard Univ., 1962, p. 46.
8 H.F. Pitkin, op.cit., p. 121.
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have meaning and sentences make sense, grammar ‘describes’ it in
such a way that it specifies the sphere of what is describable. In
other words, it describes the use of words in language and the con-
ditions of representing the world through sentences [PG 23,345]. It
does not decide about the truth or falsity of a sentence, it rather in-
vestigates the conditions and methods of its reference to the world.
Thus, this reference represents the conditions of sentence’s under-
standing [PG 45].
Grammar describes but does not explain, and at the same time
it does not formulate any postu1ates about language, it on1y de-
scribes its use. “Grammar does not tell us how language must be
constructed... It on1y describes and in no way explains the use of
signs” [PI 496]9. Description is here understood very widely, it em-
braces various aspects of conceptualising the world. Moreover, de-
scription is “a clear view of the use of our words”, allowing us to,
as a resu1t of it, dismiss one of the main sources of our misunder-
standings;  “A perspicuous representation produces  just that un-
derstanding  which  consists  in  “seeing  connexions’.  [...]  The
concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental signific-
ance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we
look at things” [PI 122].
The Aspect of Practice
An essential moment appears through referring the grammat-
ical anałysis to the notion of practice10. Wittgenstein defines prac-
tice as acting according to a rule, expressing in this way the con-
stituent  aspect of  the relation between language and the world.
The prospect of this relation becomes the basis for the categoriza-
tion of different aspects of human existence in the world. Besides,
what is equally important, the category of practice becomes norm-
ative in character, it shows the logical possibility of notional depic-
9 A good ilustration of this problem used by Wittgenstein is Eclidean space and
geometry  connected with  it.  See  L.  Wittgenstein,  Philosphical  Grammar,  Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1969, p. 319.
10 K.P. Johanessen, “Language, Art and Aesthetic Practuce...”, in: Wittgenstein –
Aesthetics as Transcendental Philosophy, Vienna 1981, p. 112.
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tion of the surroundings and of oneself. The relation between lan-
guage and practice allows one to state that the description of the
second category is, at the same time, a grammatical description of
linguistic games, which take place. This description allows at the
same time of delimiting the intelligibility of a given phenomenon
with which a context in the world takes place. The limits of intelli-
gibility are notional ones, expressed by the grammatical descrip-
tion of inter-notional relations.
Studying the logical grammar of a given practice allows of for-
mulating the identity of a phenomenon constituted by practice, as
a result  of  the  review of  its  various  relations  with surrounding
practices. For that reason, to make a logically-grammatical analysis
of a given concept is to show the account of practices in which this
concept functions and to show its relations with adjacent practices,
and  this,  in  consequence,  means  investigating  the  conditions  of
possibilities of a corresponding phenomenon. Wittgenstein states:
“We feel as if we had to  penetrate  phenomena: our investigation,
however,  is  directed not  towards phenomena,  but  as one might
say, towards the  ‘possibilities’  of phenomena” by regulating “the
kind of statement that we make about phenomena. [...] Our investig-
ation is therefore a grammatical one” [PI 90].
Out of the above remarks emerges a particular image of mutual
dependences. Language constitutes a phenomenon as this particu-
lar one and not another one. Language, on the other hand, is con-
stituted  as  an  essential  tool  in  communication  and  mutual  in-
f1uence as a result of being assigned to human acting (practices).





which in a more detailed description takes the following form:






The Aspect of Criterion
Asking about a criterion moves us into another level, but we are
still in the field of philosophical grammar, (form of life). Criterion
is  one  aspect  of  this  grammar  and  it  appears  when  explaining
grammar of a given expression. It appears literally, which means
that it is the object of reflections. However, it does not mean that
when we do not direct our attention to the problem of criterion this
problem does not exist. Criteria, residing in the background of our
statements, are “potential answers to potential questions like ‘how
do you know?’ ‘how can you tell?’  ‘what makes you think so?’
‘why do you say that?”11.
Criteria do not concern all our statements, but they become es-
sential  when  we  do  not  perceive  an  object  directly,  when  our
knowledge about an object is not given to us in that way12. It espe-
cially applies to the states of feeling, supposing, understanding, ex-
pecting, etc. [PI 182, 572, 573]. Notions associated with them are
very complex because they are connected with many expressions
and situations in which they are used.
11 H.F. Pittkin,  Wittgenstein and Justice,  op.cit., p. 126. It should be here noted
that Wittgenstein distinguishes between a criterion and a symptom, characterizing
brief1y the second term. However, it is not essential for the present remarks and
therefore it will be discussed only to a limited extent.
12
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The notion of criterion is connected with the concept of symp-
tom; it is raised when answering a question: “How do you know
that so-and-so is the case?”[BB, p.24] This seems to suggest that
both notions can be used interchangeably. However, it is not the
case. It is clearly seen when we say: “so-and-so signs (data) show
that so-and-so occurs”. Here, a reference to symptoms takes place.
However, when we say: “what kind of signs (data) must there be
in order for so-and-so to occur”, we refer to a criterion. The differ-
ence boils down to the fact that the first case concerns the empir-
ical level, and the second one goes beyond this level and it consti-
tutes a point of reference to it. It is here clearly shown that Wit-
tgenstein presents criterion and symptom as different types of jus-
tification of statements.
Wittgenstein writes that a symptom is “a phenomenon of which
experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other,
with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion” [BB, p. 25].
Therefore a symptom is correlated with a notion empirical1y, be-
hind which stands a criterion. Such a re1ation expresses a hypo-
thesis. The relation between a concept and a criterion, on the other
hand, creates a tautology or a definition. A criterion determines a
notion (the meaning of a notion) in a decisive way; hence, the em-
pirical obviousness cannot influence its relation with a notion. The
difference between a criterion and a symptom can be expressed in
such a way that it is the difference between a logical relation and
an empirical relation13.
We can get a good clarification of the problem of criterion if we
discuss it in the context of linguistic games on the one hand and
13 J.T.E.  Richardson,  The Grammar of Justification. An Interpretation of  Wittgen-
stein's Philosophy of Language, New York 1976, p. 119. 
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language as a whole on the other14. In the first case, it is about em-
phasizing the fact that the notion of a linguistic game entails the
distinction between playing (a game) and learning (a game). In the
second case, it is about depiction of language as a set of linguistic
games. It allows us to realize that not only a linguistic game (its
rules) but also language itself sets the limits of obliging and valid-
ity of a criterion. The reasons why a criterion is formulated as a not
expressive basis of language are here seen. A criterion gets its lin-
guistic (verbal) form when the game stops, when doubts occur and
when study of next moves in a game begins. Thus, a criterion pos-
sesses the feature of necessity and non-informativeness.
A criterion shows a  specific  asymmetry  between expressions
that refer to the first and the third person. A question concerning
the mental state of another person often makes sense, but such a
question directed to oneself does not. It does not make sense to say
that “I know”, that I feel so and so: “It can’t be said of me at all (ex-
cept perhaps as a joke) that I  know  I am in pain. What is it sup-
posed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain? [...] The truth is:
it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I
am in pain; but not to say it about myself [PI 246].
In conclusion, we can say that a criterion has a definitional char-
acter that does not have to be established once and for all. Hence,
the final criterion does not exist. It means that a phenomenon is
not imposed as a criterion but it can be recognized as such. This
leads to the distinction (similarly as in the case of a rule) between a
criterion and a ‘criterial sign’ (‘a criterial word’)15. A criterion de-
termines the way of employing ‘a criterial sign’, which means that
it justifies ascribing some expression of relation occurring between
phenomena.
The analysis of the concept of criterion reveals its potential as-
pect,  its  topicality  and the  circumstances  of  topicality.  It  means
that in the idea of criterion there reside some assumptions. First, a
criterion functions in specific circumstances which are usually not
verbalized.  Secondly,  these  circumstances  are  not  stated  during
formulating ‘a criterial sign” but they result from some aspects of
the linguistic  background that  constitutes a modifying reference
14 T.  Czarnecki, "Criterion and Defeasibility", in:  Akten des 14 Internationalen
Wittgenstein-Symposiums, August 1989, Wien 1990, p.116. 
15 T. Czarnecki, Gramatyka filozoficzna pojęcia 'rozumienie’ według L Wittgensteina,
The typescript of a doctoral dissertation, the Jasiellonian Library, p. 48–51.
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(not verbalized support or obstacle) to linguistic actions. All these
features attributed to a criterion usually lead to the adoption of the
linguistic conventionalism of Wittgenstein’ s second philosophy.
The Concept of Grammar
Similarly as in the previous cases, here Wittgenstein does not
specify the notion16, therefore on the basis of very few remarks that
have been made it is necessary to interpret this term. It is said that
this  category belongs to one of  the three basic  ones of Wittgen-
stein’s later thought17. It is also said that the expression “form of
life”  replaces  “grammar”,  the  main category  of  Blue  and  Brown
Books in the later period18. In the literature on this topic taken liter-
a1ly, it receives the following general meaning.
An interesting issue emerges  out of Wittgenstein’s  statement:
“to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” [PI 19]. A
relation of tota1 subordination of the first element to the second
one is here clearly shown. However, we can ask ourselves a ques-
16 It should be here noticed that the author of the German translation consist -
ently  translates  the  German  expression  Lebensform,  which  has  its  English
equiva1ent Form of Life, as a way of life. However, it seems not to be adequate be-
cause there is a difference between the meaning of the expression 'the way of life'
and the expression 'form of life’. The latter includes some contents that the first
one does not. You may say that philosophy is a certain way of life; you definitely
cannot say that it is form of life. 
17 P.F. Strawson, "Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation", in: G.
Pitcher (ed.), Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Es-
says, New York 1966, p. 62.
18 H. F. Pittkin, op.cit., p. 132.
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tion whether this relation is transitive; whether to imagine a way
of life is to imagine a language. The question concerns the possibil-
ity of identifying both categories and fields that they determine.
The positive answer would mean that form of life is linguistic in
character. Consequently, human existence would have to possess
such a character. A man would fall into the totalitarianism of lan-
guage.
In one of the next paragraphs Wittgenstein specifies the type of
dependence between these categories. From this statement it fol-
lows that it is one-way relation; a linguistic game is only one as-
pect of form of life: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part
of an activity, or of a form of life” [PI 23]. The way of life (read:
form of life) has a wider scope than language; hence language con-
stitutes only a part of it.
Although the philosopher clearly exhibits this relation, it may
be interesting to reverse it. The thing is that form of life as such is
not  directly  expressed.  Its  depiction  is  possible  only  indirectly,
through some kind of medium, in this case language. The distinc-
tion into “what can be shown” and “what can be said” (taken from
the Tractatus) seems to be explicatively usefu1. In this context the
way of life can be ‘shown’ because it harmonises with language, it
is blended with its manifestations. And it happens both when we
mean the sphere of constitutive and pragmatic rules. They belong
to “natural  history of human being [...]  which have escaped re-
mark only because they are always before our eyes” [PI 415]19.
The analysis of the notion of form of life often leads to the ac-
ceptance of the view of the conventional character of language (lin-
guistic game, rule) in Wittgenstein’s second philosophy. Conven-
tionalism as such is understood in many ways.
l.  In a popular,  commonsensical  understanding convention is
the counterpart of a contract, a result of a given compromise con-
sciously  accepted  by  people.  But  this  kind  of  conventionalism
plays a marginal role in shaping language.
2. In another approach conventionalism expresses a conviction
that a given ‘object’ is accepted not as a result of judicious agree-
ment or a conscious choice but it is rather accepted as a result of
involuntary and constant activity of people. A significant part of
19 Ibid. p. 133.
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language in the  aspects  that  distinguish one language from an-
other can be recognized as conventional.
3. However, there exists yet another sense of this notion, which
is possibly closest to the idea of form of life. It is about “natural
conventions”, which result from the features of life and the world.
These conventions are made neither by a custom nor by an agree-
ment but rather “by the nature of human life itself, the human fix
itself”20.
Usua1ly paragraph no. 241 of  Philosophical Investigations in the
context of paragraph no. 240 is quoted. “Disputes do not break out
(among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has
been obeyed or not. [...] That is part of framework on which the
working of our language is based (for example, in giving descrip-
tions)”  [PI  240].  A  consent  results  from  some ‘frames’  (“frame-
work”) on which language functions. There is no problem with in-
appropriate or appropriate use of rules, because there exists con-
sent to 1anguage, which is not unanimity of judgements and “that
is not agreement in opinions but in form of life” [PI 241 ]. There-
fore, taking part in form of life is ‘visible’ in consent to a given ap-
plication of given rules21. In other words, “when we talk of the way
linguistic conventions limit the possibilities of what can happen in
the world, what we will accept as instances of various phenomena,
we must also recognize that those conventions are not merely ar-
bitrary; they are part of a conceptual network which works, which
functions for us”22.
20 P. Cavell, "Claim to Reason", p. 217, "Here the array of 'conventions' are not
patterns of life which differentiate men from one another, but those exigencies of
conduct which all men share", p. 98; a quote after: H.F. Pitikin, op.cit., p. 133.
21 M. BIack, "Lebensform...", op.cit., p. 326.
22 H.F. Pittkin, op.cit., p. 136–137.
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Making absolutism out of this view does not seem to be justi-
fied. First, it needs to be noted that the last interpretation of con-
vention (out of the ones discussed above) is so distinct from the
usually  ascribed  meaning that  it  is,  in  fact,  at  variance  with  it.
Moreover,  the  problem  is  so  complicated  because  some  of  the
philosopher’s statements are the basis for opposite interpretations,
namely  interpretations  that  accept  or  dismiss  conventionalism.
And yet an essential, grammatical difference between such notions
as: a rule, a linguistic game, language, form of life needs to be em-
phasized. The often quoted fragment is paragraph no. 355 of Philo-
sophical  Investigations,  which serves  as  an argument  for  the  first
standpoint and whose conclusions are transferred to the rest of cat-
egories: “The point here is not that our sense-impressions can lie,
but that we understand their language. (And this language as any
other is founded on convention.)” [PI 355].
With reference to form of life such a conclusion is not justified
for at least two reasons. First of all, it is enough to cite an appropri-
ate quotation:  “What has  to be accepted,  the  given,  is  –  so one
could say – forms of life” [PI, II xi, p. 226]23. The fact that these ways
are given means that they do not fall under any form of manipula-
tion;  their  acceptance  is  a  fundamental  and  necessary  moment.
Hence, to depict the relation of a man with a way of life what is ne-
cessary  is  not  a  genetic  relationship  but  a  logical  one.  Using  a
metaphor that functions in another philosophy, it can be said that
a man is ‘thrown’ into form of life. Thereby, logically thinking, the
attitude of a subject to this  category,  its  acceptance or desire to
change it does not matter.
Secondly, the aspect of function served by form of life needs to
be emphasized. It is a category that fulfills plays the same role as
the role that the logical form is attributed in Tractatus logico-philo-
sophicus (TLP).  This fact entails very specific and momentous con-
sequences.  In TLP Wittgenstein says that “to present  the logical
form we would have to place ourselves together with a sentence
beyond logic, that is outside the world” [4.12]. In this case it is sim-
23 Also the previous statement of Wittgenstein: "the fact that we act in such and
such a way, e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so,
give orders, submit reports, describe colours, take an interest in the feelings of oth-
ers. What has to be accepted, the given – one might say – are facts of living". Re-
marks  on the Philosophy of Psychology,  I/630. A quote: O. Hanfling,  Wittgenstein’s
Later Philosophy, Univ. of New York Press, 1989, p. 144.
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ilar, to ta1k about the conventional character of form of life (gram-
mar) is to be able to change it, that is go beyond it, outside it –
which is impossible. It is this point that fully falls under remarks
made about  linguistic  games as a whole language,  as  a system.
Having a given grammar (form of life), you can built various lan-
guages, but you cannot create a new, different grammar. The pre-
sumption that the possibility of denial, of negation of some notions
gives such an opportunity is delusive as it resides as an opportun-
ity in grammar itself.
One should agree  with an observation that  the  viewpoint  of
convention includes an assessing aspect because it assumes an in-
vention and a choice24. That is why it is reasonable to ask whether
a given choice was good when we compare it with other choices,
so we, as if, have the possibility of depicting it from the outside.
That is exactly what happens in the case of conventions, institu-
tions or games. But you cannot reasonably ask whether grammar
(form of life) ‘given to us’ is good, because this would, as a con-
sequence, entail the possibility of changing it for another one, that
is  the  possibility  of  choosing it.  Form of  life,  just  as  the logical
form, sets the limits of language. As a result it can be said that
what is in our case philosophica1ly interesting is not the problem
of the functioning of language in the context of rules but the ana-
lysis of the fact that rules that have meaning only when they are
understood correctly do not help us to explain why we speak or
behave in this and not the other way.
At the base of these remarks there lies a secret assumption that
needs to be analysed. We should ask ourselves a question whether
there exists  only one form of life  or whether there  are many of
them. We can consider two possibilities: when an answer would
24 O. Hanfling, op.cit., p. 144.
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turn into the direction of the monism or the pluralism of forms of
life. An unambiguous decision is impossible because there are no
data on this topic in Wittgenstein’s works. Answers based on inter-
pretations turn either into one or the other direction.
The  monistic  understanding  of  form  of  life  is  possible  only
when a category that interests us results from genetic features of
men and when it belongs to their natural history. In this case it can
be  identified  with  “the  common  way  of  human  reaction”25.  A
powerful confirmation of such a standpoint is the following frag-
ment: 
“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural his-
tory of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however,
but observations which no one has doubted, but which have es-
caped remark only because they are always before our eyes” [PI
415].
The pluralist understanding of form of life is supported in two
points of  Philosophical Investigations.  In the first one, in paragraph
no. 19 language is identified with form of life.  The natural con-
sequence is a suggestion (the second part of the paragraph) that
one can imagine many languages and hence many forms of life. It
is not a manifested consequence and not necessarily a true one but
it has some power of persuasion. Now, this kind of reasoning is in-
correct. Wittgenstein explains it using a condition, “to imagine” is
synonymous with, in our  opinion,  saying ‘if  we can/are able to
imagine’. It is also clear that the expression “to imagine oneself a
language” does not mean “to imagine oneself a natural language”
such as Polish or English because their logical grammar (not a lin-
guistic one) is identical. It is about a language with totally different
grammar. What kind of grammar? – this kind of question has to be
left without an answer because it is within this scope of difficulty
that is connected with going beyond the logical form. It is logically
impossible: “If a lion could speak, we would not be able to under-
stand it” [PI 313 ]. Thereby, one cannot imagine an abstract possib-
ility of other form of life, (we do not possess a criterion as a basis
for distinction) because in fact we do not deal here with ‘imagining
oneself’ but with a clearly ‘notional depiction'’.
The  second  example  is  Wittgenstein’  s  statement  from  the
second part of PI; he uses the plural number – “ways of life are
25 N. Garver, "Die Lebensform in Wittgenstein's  Philosophischen Untersuchun-
gen", in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 21, 1984.
1
Remarks on L. Wittgenstein’s Form of Life
given”. We get  here two moments:  ‘being given’ and the plural
number. As a consequence, while interpreting this category it is as-
sumed that particular fields of human existence are “forms of life”.
In this way religion26 or psychoanalysis27 are dealt with. Moreover,
the category that interests us is understood as an alternative ex-
pression to “forms of culture”28 or “facts of life”29. One can agree
with neither any of these particular cases nor generally with this
kind of reasoning.
The suggestion shown above which intended to illustrate simil-
arities between the logical form and form of life seems to weaken
such solutions effectively. Form of life is the basis of justification; it
constitutes an impassable boundary for explanations. It needs to
be realized that difficulties at understanding between exhibitors of
different form of life would be absolutely impossible to overcome.
And if we assumed that there exist different forms of life and that
there are no problems with understanding them it  would mean
that  they  either  have  some  common  element  or  that  they  are
united by a form standing above them. Hence the distinction of
form into narrow and broad30, out of which the former – just like
psychoanalysis – would be contained in the latter. However, this
distinction is only an ostensible solution to the problem. Unauthor-
ised  (and  unnecessary)  mixing  of  the  levels  of  argumentation
resides in here. It also concerns other examples. The mistake con-
26 D.Z. Philips, "Religion in Wittgenstein's Mirror", in: A. P. Griffiths (ed.), Wit-
tgenstein Centenary Essays, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991, p. 135–1350.
27 M. Brearly, "Psychoanalysis: A Form of Life?", in: A P. Griffiths (ed.),  Wit-
tgenstein..., op.cit., p. 151–167.
28 D.M. High, Language, Persons, and Belief, Oxford 1967; a quote after: G.F. Se-
fler, Language and the World, New York 1974, p. 105.
29
30 M. Brearly, op.cit., p. 156–157.
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sists in ‘raising’ linguistic games to the importance of form of life.
An additional lack of identifying forms of life with the facts of life
is the fact that this thesis is not argued enough.
Form  of  life  expresses  the  broadest  cultural  context,  within
whose scope linguistic expressions function. This context is created
by a countless number of sentences, “[...] countless different kinds
of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’” [PI 23]. A
special emphasis should be put on the word ‘use’ because it be-
comes a practice in a social dimension, but you cannot neglect the
forms  of  its  (practice’s)  manifestations.  These  forms  (“word”,
“symbol”, “sentence”) are cultural categories, essential to the pos-
sibility of communication. A relation of mutual dependence is here
clearly seen: to be understood is to reside in some kind of a bigger
whole (community), in other words, to be rooted in form of life.
Form of life, on the other hand, manifests itself by means of lin-
guistic games residing in it and each and every one of them is a
specific  practice.  So  every  act  becomes  reasonable  (understood)
only in the context of social practice determined by rules and con-
ventions. It leads us to the conclusion that the notion of practice “is
something like a condition for the possibility of giving meaning to
anything at all”31.
This way of functioning of linguistic games – form of life was
further consequences: (a) justification is given only within a game
and it ceases to be in force on its borders, (b) the way of presenting
is given by a linguistic game; moreover, (c) grammar cannot be jus-
tified; and finally, d) a linguistic game is neither sensible nor in-
sensible, it is something given. A particular conclusion for the cri-
terion of justification flows from this and that is why the perspect-
ive of obliging certainty changes: 
“»We are quite sure of it« does not mean just that every single
person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is
bound together by science and education”32.
In this context the question about what it means to be this or
that should be construed as a question about the way in which the
world is given to us. It is a question about our way in which we
meet objects. Then the answer, which follows from Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy, states that being this or that (e.g. green) results
31 K.P. Johannesen, “Language...”, op.cit., p. 118.
32 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, transl. D. Paul and G.E.M. Oxford: Anscombe,
Basil Blackwell, 1979, paragr. 298.
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from our use of language in a specific way. What follows is the fact
that if language were not used in this way, things could be differ-
ent than they are now. However, apart from the possibility of stat-
ing an empirical falsehood we do not possess means to understand
it because: “We have a colour system as we have a number system.
Do the systems reside in  our or in the nature of things? How are
we to put it? –  Not in the nature of numbers or colours. Then is
there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and no. It is akin
both to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary”33.
This variety of introduced notions cannot obscure the cardinal
fact that they all, together with form of life as the broadest notion.
gain their meaning in language and through language. This fact
means that language in a transcendental way is our depiction of
the world, our world. This leads to the conclusion that the essence
of this philosophy of Wittgenstein is showing the limits of our lan-
guage as limits of our world34. This thesis can be understood em-
pirically in such a way that language is dealt with narrowly and
that it refers to the individual system of communication with its
grammatical categories, etc. The world, on the other hand, is de-
picted broadly which entails the depiction of the fact as the world
shows itself to an individual, and also general  frames of under-
standing, which a subject refers to an object. In the transcendental
way, this thesis claims that reality-for-us is constituted as a result
of conceptual ‘activity’ of culture and language. Thereby ‘a pure
33 L. Wittgenstein, Zettel. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967, paragr. 357–358
34 B. Williams,  Moral Luck,  Cambridge 1981, p. 150–151: "The new theory of
meaning,  like  the  old,  points  in  the  direction  of  transcendental  idealism,  and
shares also the problem of our being driven to state it in forms which are required
to be understood, if at all, in the wrong way", (p. 163). This interpretational thread
is also taken up by A.W. Moore, "Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and
Theories of Meaning", in: The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 35, no.139, p. 154–155.
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datum’ does not exist, what is given is a cultural fact. Just as the
philosopher states: The limits of language are revealed in the fact
that it is not able to describe that to which corresponds to a state-
ment (sentence). All it can perform is to repeat a statement. This is
connected with Kant’s solution of the problem of philosophy35.
35 L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, transl. P. Winch, Oxford 1980, p. 10.
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